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Abstract 
Bourdieu’s construct of the field of power has received relatively little attention 
despite its novelty and theoretical potential. This paper explores the meaning and 
implications of the construct, and integrates it into a wider conception of the 
formation and functioning of elites at the highest level in society. Drawing on an 
extensive dataset profiling the careers of members of the French business elite, it 
compares and contrasts those who enter the field of power with those who fail to 
qualify for membership, exploring why some succeed as hyper-agents while others 
do not. The alliance of social origin and educational attainment, class and 
meritocracy, emerges as particularly compelling. The field of power is shown to be 
relatively variegated and fluid, connecting agents from different life worlds. 
Methodologically, this paper connects biographical data of top French directors with 
the field of power in France in a novel way, while presenting an operationalization of 
Bourdieu’s concept of the field of power as applied to the French elite. 
 
Keywords: Bourdieu, elite careers, field of power, French business elites, hyper-
agency, power 
 
Introduction 
 
This paper considers the nature and practice of elite formation among top French 
directors. Elite formation as an object of study cannot be separated from the study 
of power, hence the primary focus of this paper is on French business leaders and 
the pathways taken by the most powerful amongst them into what Bourdieu (1993; 
1996) terms the ‘field of power’ (FoP hereafter). We define this as the integrative 
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social domain that transcends individual fields and organizations, which functions as 
a metafield of contestation and struggles for dominant agents – individuals who hold 
a controlling position within an organizational field – from different professional 
backgrounds (Maclean et al., 2014). Wacquant (1993: 21) describes the FoP as a 
‘configuration of power relations within which the dominants… of a society are 
arrayed and pitted against one another’. The study of power is fundamental to the 
social sciences, and to organization studies in particular (Clegg, 1989a; Clegg et al., 
2006; Courpasson, 2000; Courpasson and Golsorkhi, 2009; Reed, 2012; Zald and 
Lounsbury, 2010). Access to power (or lack of it) sets limits to organizational strategy 
as well as to individual career paths; while the outcome of power struggles at the 
societal level help to determine government policies, resource flows and the 
trajectories of social movements (Fligstein, 1997). This paper contributes to research 
on this important topic.  
Mills’ (1956) seminal study of the power elite was centred on the US, and 
other eminent scholars have followed in his footsteps in examining the American 
super elite (e.g. Davis, 2009; Domhoff, 2006; 2009; Lindsay, 2008; Mills, 1956; 
Useem, 1979; Useem and Karabel, 1986). The identification of board interlocks 
regularly assumes centre stage (Brass et al., 2004; Burris, 2005; Burt, 1980; Davis and 
Greve, 1997; Mizruchi, 1996; Mizruchi and Stearns, 1988; Palmer, 1983; Palmer et 
al., 1986). Interlocking directorships, however, as Zald and Lounsbury (2010: 967) 
point out, represent only one aspect of the study of the elite occupants of 
‘institutional and societal command posts’. This paper is intended as a response to 
the call for more research on hyper-agency and on the nature and functioning of the 
field of power (Schervish, 2003). The empirical domain is contemporary France, but 
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our conceptualization of the FoP has, we believe, wider implications. We focus on 
the social origins, careers and networking strategies of the French business elite, 
those serving as a full member of the board or executive board of at least one of 
France’s top 100 largest companies, differentiating between those whose careers 
are made within the corporate world and the minority of hyper-agents who assume 
a more pivotal role in wider society. 
Careers are the products of both institutional structures and individual 
agency (Inkson, 2007). They illuminate the ‘structuring social context’ (Goffman, 
1963: 18) where societal history meets individual life stories, combining micro and 
macro perspectives and casting light on linkages with wider society (Iellatchitch et 
al., 2003). Human activity is recursive and self-reproducing, resulting in the relative 
imperviousness of social structures to social change; yet to be an agent is also to 
have the capacity for action, ‘to “make a difference” to a pre-existing state of affairs 
or course of events’ (Giddens, 1984: 14). We identify 386 of the 1,160 individuals 
studied, near exactly a third, as hyper-agents: that is to say that they emerge as 
multi-positional actors within the FoP who regularly make common cause with 
others in issue-based coalitions formed to secure favourable legislative and 
resourcing decisions, or to conceive alternative possibilities in the struggles of the 
moment (Bourdieu, 1996; Emirbayer and Mische, 1998). We deem them ‘multi-
positional’ because the most powerful amongst them populate boardrooms drawn 
from different life worlds, including public bodies, business associations, top cultural 
and sports organizations and charities. Hyper-agency is linked to the dynamics of 
power, since agents occupying ‘strategic command posts’ (Mills, 1956: 4) in society 
tend to act in such a way as to further their personal and organizational interests and 
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in this way to legitimate desired outcomes (Brown, 1994; 1998; Clegg et al., 2006; 
Fligstein, 1997; Schervish, 2003; Suchman, 1995; Zald and Lounsbury, 2010).  
The Concept of Power  
‘Power’, according to Giddens (1981: 28-9), ‘is an integral element of all social life… 
All social interaction involves the use of power, as a necessary implication of the 
logical connection between human action and transformative capacity’. It is a 
relational concept (Clegg et al., 2006; Foucault, 1980). As such it is central to the 
study of power and politics in organizations and to contemporary organizational 
theory (Clegg, 1989a; 1989b; Courpasson, 2000; Courpasson and Golsorkhi, 2009; 
Hardy and Clegg, 1996; Hickson et al., 1971; Hindess, 1982; Pfeffer, 1992). Weber 
(1978) in particular recognized that through the process of rationalization bound up 
with organization, individuals risked becoming trapped in an ‘iron cage’ of 
bureaucracy, restricting their power and room to manoeuvre (Courpasson and Clegg, 
2006).  
 Building on Weber’s insights, Dahl (1961), who investigated community 
politics in New Haven, argued that democratic decisions were ultimately the 
outcome of contestation among a plurality of elites. Bachrach and Baratz (1962), 
however, asserted that the study of power should include examination of a second, 
concealed ‘face’ of power, embracing non-decision-making and institutional bias 
(Haugaard, 2002). Lukes (1974/2005) stated that power had to be thought about 
more widely still, as three-dimensional, to include control over the political agenda, 
being at its most efficacious when least apprehensible. In this, his views resonate 
with those of Foucault (1980), who demonstrates that power works most effectively 
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when it is least visible, being exercised through social micro-practices rather than 
through the deliberate intentions of autonomous agents (Lukes, 1974/2005; Oakes 
et al., 1998).  
Concerned with the practices and mechanisms of domination which abound 
in human living, Foucault confirms that there is no escape from power, which is 
ubiquitous, decentred and polymorphous. In Discipline and Punish (1979), he 
explores its disguise through seemingly neutral institutions whose control 
mechanisms are internalized by the individuals they seek to dominate, inducing 
conformity to social norms. Bourdieu (1991: 167) likewise conceives of power as 
perpetuated by institutions whose ‘structured and structuring’ symbolic systems 
bring ‘their own distinctive power to bear on the relations of power which underlie 
them…contributing, in Weber’s terms, to the “domestication of the dominated”’.  
 For many scholars, including Bourdieu, Foucault and Clegg, the relational 
embeddedness of power implies that it is mistaken to think in terms of cause and 
effect. For Clegg (1989b: 99), power is at once a ‘property of relations’ and a 
‘“capacity” premised on resource control’. Elsewhere, we have defined power as 
‘command over resources’ (Maclean et al., 2006). In the present paper, we broaden 
this definition to include as a vital resource the capacity of elite occupants of 
command posts to bring together diverse groups of high-status social actors to make 
common cause within the FoP. Clegg et al. (2006: 31-2), in their excellent study of 
power in organizations, accord particular focus to what is implied by the terms 
‘power to’ and ‘power over’. Quack (2013: 661-2) defines as ‘expertise as a practical 
capacity’ and ‘expertise as an instrument of domination’ respectively. What we are 
essentially dealing with here, however, is arguably ‘power with’, which concerns the 
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power to mobilize in that it encompasses ‘the transformative potential of collective 
action’ (Quack, 2013: 661), which in turn feeds into ‘power to’. Lindsay (2008: 62) 
describes this as a form of ‘convening power’, stating that the power to convene is 
the significant ‘structural advantage’ elite actors can exploit. Leading elites use this 
form of convening power to help them define reality, employing their social skills 
strategically to fashion and ultimately determine institutional arrangements 
(Fligstein, 1997). However, it is important to note as a caveat that they need to keep 
this particular type of power active, safeguarding their legitimate right to convene 
power by retaining place as an active agent within the FoP (Courpasson and 
Golsorkhi, 2009).   
 This relational, dynamic aspect of power is therefore fundamental to success 
in the FoP, as members of the business elite assemble various resources and 
channels to exert influence on their way into the FoP. The world Bourdieu (1986) 
depicts, however, is material as well as relational. In addition to this dynamic aspect 
of power, power also derives from material wealth and position, as elite agents draw 
on their different capitals (economic, cultural, social and symbolic) to enhance their 
positioning in the social structure (Anheier et al., 1995).  
The Field of Power 
Bourdieu’s work has attracted much interest from organizational theorists (e.g. 
Anheier et al. 1995; Emirbayer and Johnson 2008; Harvey et al., 2011; Mutch 2003; 
Kerr and Robinson, 2012; Oakes et al., 1998). Yet his concept of the FoP remains 
under-explored relative to his more popularized concepts of field, capital and 
habitus, in spite of its theoretical and empirical potential (Bourdieu, 1996). In Figure 
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1, we introduce our conceptualization of the FoP which, as part of our original 
contribution, seeks to explicate and develop the ideas and terminology first put 
forward by Bourdieu (1993; 1996; 2011). This depicts society as divided vertically 
into fields, each defined by the legitimate activities conducted within a particular 
social space delineated by prevailing rules of competition, practices and actor 
dispositions. As individual agents undergo career progression, they may gradually 
ascend the hierarchy within their chosen field; eventually, should they continue to 
progress, penetrating the field elite. This conceptualization of the FoP is intended to 
be more generic than the French context alone, with wider implications, being 
designed to explicate and operationalize elite formation in the West more generally. 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
In Figure 1, we show various pathways to the top which might be followed 
within individual fields, including those of health, education, public administration, 
politics, the cultural and legal fields, as well as the organizational field. In the French 
context, Bourdieu’s writing on the FoP refers specifically to the business elite closely 
intersected with those who serve the State. In this regard, our empirical study, as a 
comprehensive survey of all directors of the top 100 companies, classified by type, 
covers only one facet of the FoP, albeit a very important one, focusing namely on 
entrance achieved through membership of the business elite (including those who 
began their careers in public administration and professions and then moved into 
the business arena). In the interests of clarity, it is worth pointing out that our study 
does not cover those who made their way into the FoP exclusively through the 
administrative pathway (which is not uncommon in France), nor those who might 
have made it exclusively through a professional pathway or from other fields. 
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The concept of the power elite, informed by the seminal studies of Mills 
(1956) and Useem (1984), refers to a network of dominant agents operating 
collectively within the FoP above individual field level and within the topmost strata 
transcending distinctive organizational fields. This depiction of the power elite in 
Figure 1 as horizontal, boundary spanning, effectively sitting above and buttressed 
by individual field elites, shifts the emphasis away from the ‘vertical differentiation 
of perceived power’ (Hickson et al., 1971: 217) to the inter-organizational; the social 
space where different types of dominant agent engage as equals with their peers 
from different life worlds to form power elite coalitions in pursuit of specific 
economic, social and political objectives. These coalitions, as Figure 1 implies, are 
not ‘hard-wired’, but, as the dotted lines suggest, may form and disband in response 
to pressing issues of the day. Elevation or ascension to the level of field elite 
represents a sine qua non for the potential entry of an agent into the FoP; 
boardrooms in particular representing the ultimate loci of power in organizational 
settings (Pettigrew and McNulty, 1998). Accession to the field of power, however, is 
an arduous process which cannot be taken for granted; membership of what Mills 
(1956: 281) dubs the ‘fraternity of the successful’ depending crucially on subsequent 
engagement with other dominant agents within broader societal networks (Maclean 
et al., 2010). 
The careers of elite actors in the field of power regularly transcend 
organizational boundaries (Ancona and Caldwell, 1992; Geletkanycz and Hambrick, 
1997; O’Mahony and Bechky, 2006), connecting contests within the organization 
with broader power struggles in society-at-large. To transcend their particular 
organizational field, dominant agents must achieve voice beyond the confines of 
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their respective organization and field. Individual organizational fields may be 
viewed as sites of contestation, playgrounds or battlefields, where agents or 
institutions are defined as dominant or subordinate according to their positioning 
within the field (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992; Iellatchitch et al., 2003; Rosenbaum, 
1984). The FoP, conversely, functions as a ‘macro-level arena of struggle’ (Swartz 
2008: 50), affording access to substantial volumes of capital (economic, social and 
symbolic in particular) to the most dominant agents (Anheier et al., 1995; Harvey 
and Maclean, 2008). It both sets elite agents from different fields (such as health, 
public administration, politics, intelligentsia, art and culture, law or the media) 
against one another; while at the same time providing the necessary structural 
conditions for them to collaborate through forming time-limited, issue-based 
coalitions of interests (O’Mahony and Bechky, 2008). Players cannot rely on their 
various capitals alone, nor solely on the hand that they have been dealt in life; 
playing the game skilfully being instrumental to eventual success (Fligstein, 1997). 
Through alliances and networks forged within the FoP, elite agents seek to 
influence societal decision-making processes, resource flows, opinion formation and 
wider logics of action by strengthening commitment to particular projects or 
objectives. They ‘make accounts’, as Giddens (1984: 29) puts it, becoming the 
purveyors of legitimizing narratives or scripts designed to inform collective systems 
of meaning in order to effect or impede institutional change (Creed et al., 2002; 
Lindsay, 2008; Lounsbury and Glynn 2001; Mills, 1940; Scott, 2001; Scott and Lyman, 
1968; Vaara, 2002). Fligstein (1997) explains how they exploit their social skills in 
order to direct authority and frame action. It is crucial, however, that their actions 
are legitimized by wider public perceptions of their civic-mindedness and 
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disinterestedness (Bourdieu 1996: 389; Harvey et al., 2011), since, as Fligstein (1997: 
400) argues, ‘If others think that one wants something and that it is narrowly for 
selfish purposes, then they are unlikely to try to negotiate’. Through playing the 
game with skill, elite agents are able to influence their own positioning within the 
‘“supra-individual” structuration of social institutions’ (Giddens, 1984: xxv). In 
asserting their ‘right’ to discourse in a Foucauldian sense (Bourdieu, 1987; Domhoff, 
2009; White, 1979), the most powerful amongst them ‘struggle to impose their 
particular capital… as the most legitimate for dominating an entire social order’ 
(Swartz, 2008: 50); eventually forcing action through legislative or quasi-legislative 
means. In this way, through hyper-agency, they seek to counter such countervailing 
power and resistance to their agendas as might arise in order to pursue their 
interests, personal and organizational. 
Methodology 
Our methodology is prosopographical. We gathered data on the social origins, 
education, careers, networks, affiliations, distinctions and interests of the executive 
and non-executive directors of the top 100 companies in France (with the exception 
of employee representatives who lack power for the reason that, while they are 
entitled to attend board meetings, they are not permitted to speak and therefore 
effectively have no voice) in post for part or all of the period 1998-2004, since 
‘sampling large firms best represents the population to which the sociology of the 
corporate elite is most applicable’ (Davis et al., 2003: 314). Composition of the top 
100 French companies was determined by size by computing an equally weighted 
composite measure based on total capital employed, turnover, profit-before-tax, 
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and employment (Grant, 1997); market capitalization having been rejected as a 
selection criterion because of its susceptibility to short-term fluctuations. 
 To profile individual members of the elite, data were gathered from five main 
sources: company annual reports and accounts; Le Guide des Etats Majors des 
grandes enterprises for 1999 to 2004; Who’s Who in France for 2004 and its online 
version, which furnished on data social origins, education, careers, interests, 
honours and distinctions; extensive web searches, including standard business 
sources for director information such as company websites, Business Week, Forbes 
and the Financial Times; newspaper and periodical articles sourced using the 
Highbeam research service. The project database was built through the addition of 
data on a case-by-case basis using multiple tables in an integrated relational 
structure. We ran consistency routines for data recorded in the database, and then 
populated fields in the project spreadsheet. Finally, two of the authors coded the 
spreadsheet separately, debating and reconciling problematic cases as these arose, 
including any partly subjective judgements such as parental social class, to ensure 
reliability. 
Individual cases are defined uniquely using their last name and forenames. 
Titles, gender, age and nationality were recorded, and the year he or she first joined 
the main board of a top 100 French company. With regard to social class, a four-way 
classification was adopted: upper class, upper-middle class, lower-middle class, and 
lower class (Halsey, 1995). Classification was undertaken mainly on the basis of 
parental occupation, supplemented by information on place of upbringing and family 
circumstances. Upper class was reserved for those with parents holding high office 
or having large fortunes. Upper-middle class was reserved for top professionals such 
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as lawyers, medical doctors, graduate engineers, senior state officials, and business 
men and women in senior but not the very highest positions. Lower-middle class was 
applied to those from white-collar occupations such as school teachers, sales people, 
lesser officials and technicians; while lower class was reserved for parental 
occupations such as worker (ouvrier), van driver and miner.  
Place of birth was coded as falling into one of eight regions on the French 
mainland, with additional categories for those born in a French colony or in another 
country. Educational data were coded by attendance or not at an elite school and by 
attendance or not at one or more elite higher education institution. Many individuals 
attended more than one secondary school, with substantial numbers being educated 
locally before entering an elite institution to prepare for the examinations (in classes 
préparatoires) for entry into elite higher education (HE) institutions. Top academic 
qualifications by grade and subject type are recorded for each individual, in addition 
to professional qualifications. Declared or revealed involvement in sport and culture 
was recorded in each case; though under-recording is likely, given that not all 
individuals report their personal pursuits and pastimes. 
Data on state honours were collected for the Légion d’Honneur (LdH) and the 
Ordre National du Mérite (ONM), each of which has the same ranking system. 
Membership of a grand corps is a signifier of membership of the French civic elite at 
the very highest level (Bourdieu, 1996). Known data were gathered for the Conseil 
d’Etat, Corps des Mines, Cour des Comptes, Inspection des Finances, and the Corps 
des Ponts et Chaussées, the most prestigious of these within business being arguably 
the Corps des Mines and the Inspection des Finances. 
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Individuals are classified according to their career type: those who spend 
most or almost all their careers in the private sector; those whose careers 
commenced within government departments (public administration) before entering 
business; and finally those who began their career in a profession (academia, law, 
medicine etc) before entering the corporate sector. They are also classified 
according to the type of activity that served as a foundation for their subsequent 
advancement. The number of top 100 company main board memberships and non-
top 100 main board memberships held by an individual on both 1st January 1998 and 
1st January 2004 are recorded, but subsidiary board memberships are disregarded on 
the basis that we are here concerned with discrete and separate organizations. Non-
top 100 French companies are included if recognized as large companies by inclusion 
in Le Guide des Etats Majors. Non-French companies are also recorded, but only 
those that might be classified as large companies.  
Given our interest in the FoP, the specific nature of the power base, the 
primary organizational field in which each director is embedded is recorded. Power 
bases include academia, banking and finance, the corporate sector excluding banks 
and finance houses, family trusts as the vehicles used by owner families to maintain 
control, the law, and the State. Likewise, the type and extent of engagement in 
external networks is noted, including involvement in charities, public bodies, 
business organizations, higher education, sports and culture. To gauge an individual’s 
activities in the FoP, network size is captured by recording both the total number of 
corporate and extra corporate board memberships.  
Empirical Analysis 
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Characteristics of the French Corporate Elite 
The French business class is often depicted as a relatively small, close-knit world (cf. 
Davis et al., 2003), surrounded by a relatively impermeable social boundary, and 
typified by high-density ‘strong’ or ‘closure ties’ which foster local cohesion and at 
times also promote concerted action by elites (Bauer with Bertin-Mourot, 1987; 
Bauer and Bertin-Mourot, 1997; Burt et al., 2000; Comet and Finez, 2010; Hartmann, 
2000; 2007; Kadushin, 1995; Maclean, 2002; Maclean et al., 2007; Oh et al., 2004; 
Suleiman, 1978). This ‘social closure’ (Ramirez, 2001) is in contrast to the weaker ties 
of lower-density networks identified by Granovetter (1973), more typical of the US 
or UK (Maclean et al., 2006). This is a corporate world closely allied to a supportive 
State apparatus, which facilitates connections through the grands corps, such as the 
Inspection des Finances, the Corps des Mines or the Cour des Comptes, the pinnacle 
of France’s civil service elite; as well as through key organs of government, especially 
the Treasury, or ministerial Cabinets. As many as 27 per cent of top French directors 
included in our sample moved from the public to the private sector, i.e. they began 
their career working for the State. The grands corps fosters an esprit de caste, 
likened to forms of extended family or freemasonry (Barsoux and Lawrence, 1990). 
Suleiman (1978: 197) describes the grands corps as ‘placement bureaux’, 
commenting that no one ever entered the Inspection des Finances to inspect 
finance, or the Corps des Mines to fashion a career in mining. As Bourdieu observes, 
the grands corps consecrate social identities that are both in competition and 
complementary, such that, despite the rivalry between individual corps, all corpsards 
are ‘united by a genuine organic solidarity’ (1996: 142).  
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Yet, while many members of the French business elite have at times 
identified more readily than in other countries with the State agenda, it would be 
mistaken to think of the corporate elite as monolithic and homogenous. A more 
accurate representation is that the elite has a number of defining characteristics, but 
at the same time is relatively diverse in several crucial aspects. The upper echelon of 
the French business system, like many others, is largely a male preserve (96% in 
1998), is mainly composed of people born and bred in the country (88% in 1998), is 
drawn predominantly from people from upper and upper-middle class backgrounds 
(62% in 1998), and is highly educated (96% to first degree level, 71% to master’s 
degree level and 10% holding a doctorate  in 1998) in elite institutions (75% in 1998). 
This picture has changed relatively little over recent decades (Comet and Finez, 
2010; Martinache, 2011). However, alongside these similarities there are also 
interesting differences. Members of the elite may be educated and work in Paris, but 
they are drawn there from all parts of France. Moreover, as French business has 
internationalized, significant minorities are gradually but increasingly being 
appointed to French boards from Belgium, Germany, Italy, Switzerland, Spain, the UK 
and the USA (Davoine and Ravasi, 2013; Harvey and Maclean, 2010; Wagner, 2011). 
Likewise, while science, engineering and mathematics (36% in 1998) and law, 
business, economics and management (53% in 1998) are the two main higher 
education platforms for business elite careers, there is considerable subject variation 
within those broad categories.  
We suggest that as for many national business systems, there has in the 
French case been a tendency to simplify and over-generalize with respect to matters 
relating to elite selection, reproduction, networking and the exercise of power 
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(Barsoux and Lawrence, 1990). In what follows we suggest that the business elite is 
slightly more differentiated and pluralist than has been portrayed, highlighting in 
particular the different pathways to power taken by those who come to exercise 
power at the very highest level in society.  
Entering the Field of Power 
We identify members of the business elite operating within the FoP in France as 
those satisfying a minimum of two of four criteria: (i) appointment as a top tier 
executive (y1), the CEO or Executive Chairman of a top 100 company, including those 
styled Président Directeur-Général (PDG) and Président du Directoire; (ii) a corporate 
networker (y2), defined as holding at least two board memberships of top 100 French 
companies or one top 100 company and at least two other directorships of medium 
to large-sized companies; (iii) an extra corporate networker (y3), signified by 
membership of two or more national or international non-business boards or 
equivalent high office outside business; (iv) a entrepreneur (y4), with significant 
ownership rights. In effect, application of the four differentiating criteria divides the 
French business elite into two categories, those who become power brokers at the 
wider societal level within the FoP (386 individuals) and those whose careers remain 
confined in large measure to the corporate world (774 individuals). 
 This method of determining which members of the business elite are 
operating within the FoP acknowledges that those occupying high office in the 
business sphere have different power bases (including academia, banking, finance, 
business, a family trust, the law or the State), and recognizes that individuals who 
can meet more than one criterion are those most likely to function effectively at the 
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societal level. The four individual pathways (y1, y2, y3, y4) were identified as 
embracing the most vital aspects of power, in that through their positions of top-tier 
director, corporate networker, extra-corporate networker and entrepreneur, they 
enjoy both managerial control (CEO) and ownership (y1 and y4), while reflecting other 
aspects of power which connect them with other life worlds, emphasizing the 
importance of networks, and suggestive of the notion of ‘power with’ and the power 
to convene (y2 and y3) (Fligstein, 1997; Lindsay, 2008; Quack, 2013).  
In Table 1 we display our findings on the pathways taken by individuals 
acceding to the FoP in France. Part A of the table relates to entry qualifications, the 
four individual pathways to power that individuals might follow. It can be seen that 
of the 1,160 individuals profiled, just 17% of the elite qualified as top tier executives 
of a top 100 French company (pathway y1). However, the individuals pursuing this 
pathway almost certainly (with 91% probability) entered the FoP. The second 
pathway (y2), corporate networker, characterized by multiple directorships of top 
100 and other large companies, were more numerous (32% of the elite), 84% of 
whom made it into the FoP. An even larger number (48% of the elite) qualified as an 
extra corporate networker (y3), but only 68% of them entered the FoP. The fewest 
number (4.5% of the elite) qualified by having significant ownership (y4) rights in 
large companies, of whom 90% entered the FoP.  
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
In Part B of the table, the frequencies are exhibited in rank order for each of 
the nine discrete pathway combinations followed by the 386 individuals entering the 
FoP.  This specifies more clearly the composition of the elite within the French 
business elite, identifying by type the hyper-agents who represent the business 
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community within the FoP in France. Our empirical findings have shown that the 
predominant type (47%), while not the most powerful, concerns senior executives 
below the rank of CEO in large companies who have extensive networks within the 
corporate and other life worlds (Maclean et al., 2010: 334-5). The most powerful 
agents, in the main, are the top tier executives and owner-executives who combine 
three or four pathways in acceding to the FoP (Maclean et al., 2010: 336-7). The 
most numerous (24%) are the top tier corporate and extra corporate networkers who 
lead (CEO, Executive Chairman or Chairman and CEO) large companies and who sit 
on the boards of other large companies and national or international organizations 
outside the corporate sector. These individuals are rivalled only by the 15 (4%) top 
tier owner corporate and extra corporate networkers who bestride the FoP in France. 
Other pathway combinations reveal interesting variations on the theme. A large 
minority of top tier executives, for instance, are not corporate networkers, 
preferring instead to channel their energies within their own companies and build 
networks within the field as top tier extra corporate networkers (15%). A further 6 
business owners, as top tier owner extra corporate networkers (1.6%) likewise steer 
clear of corporate networking while building extensive extra corporate networks as 
engaged actors operating within the FoP.  
Education, Social Origins and the Field of Power 
The French business elite has at times been perceived as united by a shared 
education, being educated on the same benches of the same elite schools (Barsoux 
and Lawrence, 1990; Eymeri, 2001). Table 2 confirms that graduation from an elite 
higher education institution is the norm for those who progress to the top in French 
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business. The degree of concentration in attendances even within the set of elite 
grandes écoles and universities is noteworthy, with 52% of all attendances being at 
just one of ten institutions. It is common to progress from one elite higher education 
institution to another, and for scientists, engineers and mathematicians to progress 
to study economics, business, management or social sciences at postgraduate level. 
Those wishing to work for the State for some time and having sufficiently high 
grades might gain admission to the elite national college of public administration, 
the Ecole Nationale d’Administration (ENA). Others might work in business for a few 
years and then apply to a prestigious business school at home or abroad such as 
Harvard. Increasingly, in a change from previous decades, more are studying at 
business schools which were not initially considered as leading to top-tier positions, 
such as ESSEC Business School, established in 1907, or HEC Paris, founded in 1881 by 
the Paris Chamber of Commerce and Industry. The curricula these schools offer 
reflect the diverse knowledge needed to lead and manage successfully in global 
enterprises, including the study of international political economy and cross-cultural 
management, alongside more traditional business school subjects. The emphasis on 
integrated learning, engagement with practice and practitioners, problem solving 
and decision making increasingly has been picked up from leading US schools by elite 
institutions in France, including institutions with a primarily technological identity, 
such as the Ecole des Mines de Paris, which now offers an Executive MBA (2014). 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
Having an elite education of one type or another is virtually a necessary 
condition of reaching the pinnacle of French business, but it is by no means 
sufficient. Even though the numbers attending elite institutions are relatively small 
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when set against the total number of university and college graduates, there is 
nevertheless still a surfeit of individuals with the most prized qualifications from the 
supposedly best places. Outstanding academic performance at an elite institution of 
higher education, we reason, is not what differentiates between members of the 
corporate field elite who enter the field of power and those who do not. The ‘X-
factor’, we propose, stems from the compelling combination of coming from the 
right place (social origin) and personal accomplishment (merit). Following Bourdieu 
(1986; 1996), we hypothesise that being born into an upper or upper-middle class 
family imparts the dispositions, distinctions, cultural and social capital necessary to 
take full advantage of opportunities that arise as careers unfold. In particular, active 
networking and social capital accumulation within and without corporate 
organizations is facilitated by the social polish, ease of manner and expectation of 
inclusion that stems from being born into the habitus of existing power brokers (Le 
Wita, 1994). Those from a well-to-do background, we suggest, come better equipped 
to recognize and realize opportunities than equally talented colleagues from less 
privileged backgrounds (Dezalay, 1995; Hartmann, 2000; Maclean et al., 2012a). 
Evidence in support of our hypothesis is presented in Table 3. This suggests 
that social class is strongly implicated in helping to determine those who enter the 
FoP, as confirmed by the Chi-square test statistic. The overall probability of an 
agent’s entering the FoP is 33.8% (see Panel A). However, those originating from 
classes one and two exhibit a much higher probability of entry, 51.6% and 42.2% 
respectively. Hence, an agent in class one, the upper class, is 3.72 times more likely 
to enter the FoP compared to an individual in the third social class (i.e. 51.6% divided 
by 13.9%). In stark contrast, agents from the third and fourth social class have only a 
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slim chance of entering the FoP. Panel B considers row percentages, displaying the 
distribution of social class both inside and outside the FoP. From this, we observe 
that 83.9% of members of the FoP belong to social classes one or two. Viewed in this 
light, the relationship between high social status and ultimate accession to the FoP 
emerges as especially close.  
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
Networks and the Functioning of the Field of Power 
In Table 4 we present the results of our analysis by director type and corporate 
connectivity of the main board directors of France’s top 100 companies in 1998. This 
is revealing in two main aspects. First, it demonstrates that the members of the 
business elite play different roles within the national business system. As many as 
854 of the 1,160 member of the elite are corporate executives, divided almost 
equally between those who serve a single company and those who connect the 
company they serve as an executive with others. These corporate connectors add 
value to firms within their corporate network through knowledge exchange, 
calibration against norms, developing consensus and the initiation of collaboration 
or joint action in relation to common threats or opportunities (Bühlmann et al., 
2012; Geletkanycz and Hambrick, 1997). The remaining three types of director within 
the business elite constitute small but substantial minorities. One group is made up 
of non-executives who serve a single company. Some of these are former executives 
who remain on the board after retirement; others are specialists who bring expertise 
from different walks of life; and others are shareholder representatives, quite often 
senior members of family-owned firms. A second group comprises senior public 
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servants who represent the interests of government on the boards of firms in which 
the State has retained a significant shareholding. These people are the ‘eyes and 
ears’ of officialdom, directly connecting the State with the business sector. The third 
group is composed of non-executives who serve more than one company. Typically 
these are individuals who prolong their careers following retirement from executive 
responsibility and who are prized as advisors, communicators and influencers, often 
within the political realm. 
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
The second main point emerging from Table 4 is that the degree of 
connectivity varies considerably between members of the business elite. A majority 
of State representatives sits on just a single board, although a sizeable minority have 
more extensive networks, connecting between two and four boards. Just one of 
them is in the super corporate connector class of five or more boards. This class is 
made up of just over 9% of the business elite drawn mainly from the ranks of 
executive and non-executive networker directors. Of the 105 super corporate 
connectors identified, almost three-quarters of these are executive networkers, the 
ultra-powerful individuals who dominate the French corporate system and who 
qualify as hyper-agents, typically the chief executives of the largest companies who 
are invited to join the boards of other pillars of the French business establishment 
(Comet and Finez, 2010; Denord et al., 2011; Dudouet and Joly, 2010; François, 
2010). 
Further insights concerning the connectivity of the French business elite 
emerge from the analysis presented in Table 5. In this, the French business elite is 
divided into six categories by primary current association: French corporate board 
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(77.4%), international (non-French) corporate board (9.9%), banking and finance 
(5.2%), law and other professions (0.7%), politics and public administration (5.6%), 
and academia (1.2%). Table 5 makes clear the interpenetration between State and 
business elites, confirming that a high proportion of those whose power base is now 
within the business sector were once employed by the State. However, the extent to 
which French companies have welcomed foreign nationals on to their boards as they 
have extended their international reach is less well known (Davoine and Ravasi, 
2013; Wagner, 2011). Likewise, growth at home and abroad, often through mergers 
and acquisitions, has required the close support of the investment banks, leading to 
their partners and senior employees being appointed to numerous corporate boards. 
The appointment to boards of a small number of individuals from the law, academia 
(scientists and economists) and other professions is interesting, reflecting an 
appreciation of the specialist talents of top people within those fields. 
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
 It can be observed that individuals with different power bases (to wit 
academia, banking, finance, business, a family trust, the law or the State), bring with 
them their own network of connections from within and outside the corporate 
world, broadening the potential sphere of access and influence available to Top 100 
companies. At any one time, a director will likely have a portfolio of appointments to 
boards, advisory groups, government commissions, representative bodies and the 
like. The value of such connectors lies in knowing from the inside what is going on in 
high places, and how to access influencers and decision makers (O’Mahony and 
Bechky, 2006; 2008). Charities, public bodies, business associations, educational 
institutions, sporting clubs and cultural organizations are all places where 
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participation in governance makes for connection within the FoP. The mingling of 
elites in diverse settings helps to attune minds and form a consensus as a basis for 
action by power elite coalitions, as depicted in Figure 1. Table 5 confirms just how 
well connected are those with a power base in international business and banking 
and finance (Kadushin, 1995; Kerr and Robinson, 2012); demonstrating further the 
reach of the business elite into the public sphere, and its connectivity in the 
governance of business associations. The connectivity of the business elite with 
higher education, most often with schools attended, serves to reinforce the 
hegemony and ideological unity imparted by the most highly prized French 
educational establishments (Comet and Finez, 2010; Dudouet and Joly, 2010; Eymeri, 
2001). 
Discussion and Conclusion 
The study of elites is arguably downplayed in the social sciences literature, especially 
relative to its critical importance to the workings of society and to ‘world-making’ by 
elite agents (Bourdieu, 1987; Clegg et al., 2006; Maclean et al., 2012b; Savage and 
Williams, 2008). Given that the cogency of organizational research lies first and 
foremost in its data (Courpasson et al., 2008: 1387), a quintessential aspect of a 
reinvigorated examination of power and elites is the need to ‘obtain the evidence… 
and to think of each [social] phenomenon as paradoxical or counter-intuitive’ 
(Courpasson and Golsorkhi, 2009: 62). This we have endeavoured to do. 
There is arguably a common perception that the French corporate elite is 
relatively undifferentiated, comprising a self-reproducing oligarchy who act and 
think alike (Barsoux and Lawrence, 1990; Bauer with Bertin-Mourot, 1987; Bauer and 
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Bertin-Mourot, 1997; Eymeri, 2001; Milesi, 1990; Suleiman, 1978). This is arguably 
how the French corporate elite has traditionally appeared to the outside world (Burt 
et al., 2000; Kadushin, 1995). Our study demonstrates that, despite forming a 
relatively small world, ‘particularly closed in on itself’, the French corporate elite is in 
fact slightly more nuanced and differentiated than it is at times assumed to be 
(Comet and Finez, 2010: 9-10; Davis et al., 2003; Useem and Karabel, 1986). 
Although our empirical study ended just before the onset of the financial crisis in 
2007, nevertheless we can speculate that one effect of the crisis on the corporate 
elite may be to spur it to become more differentiated, in particular to admit more 
international directors into its fold (Wagner, 2011). In the continuing grip of a global 
crisis (at the time of writing, France is not yet out of recession), it makes sense for 
the boards of top French companies to spread their risks and capture a broader 
perspective by becoming more internationalized (Davoine and Ravasi, 2013; Harvey 
and Maclean, 2010). Of the 1,160 dominant corporate agents profiled, 386, 
approximately one third, were found to have acceded to the FoP as ‘dominant 
dominants’. We find this group of hyper-agents to be differentiated by power – in 
terms of whether they accede to the FoP or not; whether they achieve top-tier or 
next-best positions; and whether they extend their reach into different life worlds or 
remain confined to the business sphere. They are also differentiated by actor type 
and career trajectory. In other words, a reasonably large and diverse cast of actors is 
found to represent business within the FoP in France. 
Three interesting observations emerging from this study require emphasis 
and point to the necessity for further research. The first is that the four pathways to 
power identified are interlinked, illustrative in part of the ‘contemporary fluidity of 
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elites’ highlighted by Zald and Lounsbury (2010: 971). This might be a reflection of 
structural changes in the French economy, given the increasing proportion of 
financial and professional services amongst the largest French companies (Ramirez, 
2010). Our inclination, however, is to interpret this as suggesting that the FoP 
requires diversity, albeit perhaps a rather limited form of diversity within the 
parameters of ‘very strong social endogamy’ (Denord et al., 2011: 37); and that there 
may in fact be different ways of linking the French business system with the body 
politic. The implication is that the FoP is more of a ‘mixed bag’ than it may initially 
appear. There are other dominant agents in the system with interesting and varied 
roles to play in society. This corresponds with the need for dominant agents to 
‘convene power’ by forming provisional issue-based coalitions of interests in the FoP 
with players from different backgrounds and power bases, in the manner of ‘power 
with’ outlined above (Lindsay, 2008; O’Mahony and Bechky, 2008; Quack, 2013). 
Viewed on this light, contemporary coalitions of interests are not fixed or ‘hard-
wired’ but rather emerge in response to issues which arise, despite residual loyalties 
based on shared schools and grands corps. Hence we might see them as more 
flexible than might at first appear, more akin to ‘wi-fi’, as depicted in Figure 1, being 
able to reconfigure, reform and regroup as the need arises in pursuit of diverse 
personal, political and organizational interests and agendas on a case-by-case basis 
(Clegg et al., 2006; Zald and Lounsbury, 2010). This depiction of the FoP, we 
acknowledge, goes beyond our empirical findings, being informed by our 
interpretation of our data. To this end, while the organizational field has attracted 
some interest from scholars in terms of its capacity to lead to the FoP (Denord et al., 
2011; Maclean et al., 2014), there is a need for future research to be conducted into 
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elites recruited in particular from other sub-fields, who pursue alternative pathways 
to the top, and who serve as members of these coalitions of power, including those 
identified in Figure 1. 
Our second observation concerns causality regarding who does and who does 
not succeed in penetrating the FoP in France. A basic requirement clearly is the need 
to be well schooled in the French system, and Table 2 reveals some positive relations 
in this regard. When a high-status background is lacking, an elite educational 
grounding is all the more precious to the individual concerned (Reay et al., 2009). 
Nevertheless, attendance at a grande école does not emerge as the ultimate 
discriminator it is often assumed to be, for the simple reason that many people 
attend grandes écoles. What matters more, we suggest, is the alliance of social origin 
and educational attainment, the union of class and meritocracy. Transparently, 
corporate agents from less well-to-do backgrounds must run harder and faster to 
acquire the dispositions, skills and know-how to ascend the corporate ladder and 
break out to accede to the FoP, as Table 3 confirms (Maclean et al., 2012a). In a 
meritocracy, the game may be open to all comers, theoretically at least. However, 
how games are constructed in the first place forms an important part of the 
equation (Fligstein, 1997); and the game is stacked in the favour of the sons and 
daughters of the rich and powerful (Dezalay, 1995; Hartmann, 2000). 
Our final observation relates to the importance of corporate and extra-
corporate networking to the composition and functioning of the FoP. Corporate 
agents acceding to the FoP, the majority serving executives, exhibit considerable 
diversity of type and connectivity. They are confirmed as multi-positional agents, 
whose reach extends into different life worlds by dint of their external ties 
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(Geletkanycz and Hambrick , 1997; O’Mahony and Bechky, 2006), enabling them 
more readily to form the issue-based coalitions and pressure groups that have the 
capacity to frame action, direct agendas, shape public opinion, influence resource 
flows, and even, on occasion, to (re)set the rules of the game at the societal level 
(Fligstein, 1997; Lindsay, 2008). Corporate and extra-corporate networking activities 
are complementary, and those who accumulate the highest levels of social and 
symbolic capital within this milieu invariably wield the most power and influence. In 
this regard, we propose that the most successful agents in building and exploiting 
networks, insinuating themselves in positions of power and influence, are those 
emerging from the upper and upper-middle classes. Once established as hyper-
agents within the FoP, they are able more readily to prolong their careers, picking up 
significant appointments on a serial basis. The implication is that incumbents are not 
easily ousted from the system; the FoP exhibiting a considerable degree of 
‘stickiness’ in this regard. 
This paper contributes to the relatively sparse literature on business elites 
entering and operating within the FoP, generally and specifically. We concentrate in 
this regard on the organizational field, that is to say on accession to the FoP achieved 
through membership of the business elite, rather than via other possible routes 
highlighted in Figure 1, such as the legal or medical field. We break new ground 
theoretically through our conceptualization of the FoP which articulates and 
develops the concept and terminology first propounded by Bourdieu (1993; 1996; 
2011); exploring the meaning and implications of the construct, and integrating it 
into a wider conception of the formation and functioning of elites at the highest level 
in society more generally. Methodologically, we connect biographical data of top 
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French directors with the FoP in France in a novel way. Using a detailed dataset, our 
study takes a closer look at the composition of the FoP in France, comparing and 
contrasting those who enter the FoP with those who fail to qualify for membership. 
In this way, our analysis connects micro and macro levels of analysis, linking the 
careers of individual agents with the bigger picture of the functioning of elite groups 
within society (Iellatchitch et al., 2003). In focusing on the business sphere, as 
opposed to other potential pathways to the FoP featured in Figure 1, it is 
understandable that the group under study might ostensibly exhibit social closure 
(Eymeri, 2001; Ramirez, 2001). However, we found in the course of this study that 
the French corporate elite is actually slightly more nuanced and differentiated than 
traditional perceptions might imply, suggestive of the multidimensional nature of 
power in the French corporate world. We suggest that this is a trajectory which is 
likely to continue, given the financial crisis, as the net of expertise is by necessity cast 
more widely to meet global challenges in the future. 
Given the close relationship between high social status and the probability of 
entering the FoP, as highlighted in Table 3, we further suggest that organization 
theorists should look afresh at issues of social class. The language of class has been 
quietened in recent decades, overridden by notions of a ‘classless’, individualized 
society and a seemingly ever-enlarging middle class; and by the politics of identity, 
gender and ethnicity which have arguably taken centre stage (Bennett et al., 2009; 
Pakulski and Waters, 1996; Scott, 2002). As a result, the broader ramifications of 
inequality viewed as hierarchy have tended to be overlooked (Bottero, 2004). Class 
processes, however, increasingly operate through ‘individualized distinction’ 
(Savage, 2000: 102). Widening inequalities, exacerbated by the current crisis 
 30 
(Godechot, 2011), throw down the gauntlet to society to produce and nurture a 
more inclusive leadership; in this sense too, elites are ‘on trial. It therefore seems to 
us that the continuing effects of class differentiation on processes of hierarchy merit 
re-examination (Bottero, 2004; Maclean et al., 2014; Reay et al., 2009). 
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Figure 1: Elite Actors in the Field of Power 
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Table 1: Entry of Corporate Agents into the Field of Power in France 
 
A: Entry Qualifications (observations = 1,160) 
 
 
 
Pathway 
 
 
 
Code 
 
 
No. 
Qualifying 
 
 
% Qualifying 
 
No. 
within 
FoP 
%  
qualifying 
within FoP 
Top Tier Executive y1 198 17.1 180 90.9 
Corporate Networker y2 366 31.6 309 84.4 
Extra Corporate Networker y3 555 47.8 379 68.3 
Ownership y4 52 4.5 47 90.4 
B: Entrants into the Field of Power (386 of 1,160) 
 
 
Type of Actor in FoP 
 
Pathway 
Combination 
No. of 
Entrants into 
FoP 
% of 
Entrants into 
FoP 
Corporate and Extra Corporate 
Networker 
y2 + y3 182 47.2 
Top Tier Corporate and Extra 
Corporate Networker 
y1 + y2 + y3 94 24.4 
Top Tier Extra Corporate 
Networker 
y1 + y3 58 15.0 
Top Tier Owner Corporate and 
Extra Corporate Networker 
y1 + y2 + y3 + y4 15 3.9 
Owner Corporate and Extra 
Corporate Networker 
y2 + y3 + y4 12 3.1 
Owner Extra Corporate 
Networker 
y3 + y4 12 3.1 
Top Tier Owner Extra 
Corporate Networker 
y1 +y3 + y4 6 1.6 
Top Tier Corporate Networker y1 + y2 5 1.3 
Top Tier Owner Corporate 
Networker 
y1 + y2 + y4 1 0.3 
Top Tier Owner y1 + y4 1 0.3 
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Table 2: Higher Education and the French Business Elite* 
 
 
 
Institution Name 
 
 
 
Institution Type 
 
 
Year 
Founded 
 
 
No. of 
Attendances 
 
 
% of all 
Attendances 
École Polytechnique Engineering, 
Sciences and 
Mathematics 
1794 222        11.8 
Institut d’Études 
Politiques de Paris 
(IEP) (Sciences Po) 
Social Sciences 1872 174 9.3 
École National  
d’Administration 
(ENA) 
Public 
Administration 
1945 144 7.7 
HEC Paris Business and 
Management 
1881   96 5.1 
Université Paris 1 – 
Panthéon Sorbonne 
Law, Humanities and 
Social Sciences 
1252    93 4.9 
École des Mines de 
Paris (ENSMP) 
Engineering, 
Sciences, Economics 
and Management 
1783   73 3.9 
Université Paris 2 – 
Panthéon-Assas 
Law, Management, 
Social and 
Information Sciences 
1252   64 3.4 
Harvard Business 
School 
Business and 
Management  
1908   39 2.1 
ESSEC Business 
School 
Business and 
Management 
1907   38 2.0 
École Centrale Paris Engineering, Science 
and Technology 
1829   35 1.9 
Note:  *Data are available for 1,064 individuals with a combined attendance of 
1,880, and a mean attendance rate of 1.77 attendances per head.  The top ten 
institutions account for 52.1% of all attendances. 
Source:  French business elites database.  This contains data on the 1,160 directors 
(executives and non-executives) of the Top 100 companies in France in 1998.  
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Table 3: Social Class and the Field of Power in France 
Panel A: column percentage       
  Social class    
  1 2 3 4 Total 
Not in FoP 105 267 298 46 716 
 (48.4) (57.8) (86.1) (80.7) (66.2) 
In FoP 112 195 48 11 366 
 (51.6) (42.2) (13.9) (19.3) (33.8) 
Total 217 462 346 57 1,082 
  (100) (100) (100) (100)   
Panel B: row percentage       
  Social class    
  1 2 3 4 Total 
Not in FoP 105 267 298 46 716 
 (14.7) (37.3) (41.6) (6.4) (100) 
In FoP 112 195 48 11 366 
 (30.6) (53.3) (13.1) (3.0) (100) 
Total 217 462 346 57 1,082 
 (20.1) (42.7) (32.0) (5.3) (100) 
Chi-square test         
Statistic 112.09     
p-value 0.000         
Source:  French business elites database.  This contains data on the 1,160 directors 
(executives and non-executives) of the Top 100 Companies in France in 1998. Of 
these we know the social class of 1,082 individuals. 
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 Table 4:  Corporate Connectors in France (n = 1,160) 
Director Type 
 
Single 
Board 
Connecting 2-
4 Boards* 
Connecting  
5 Boards* 
Total 
Executive Networker 
Number 
Row % 
 
      0 
      0.0 
 
    344 
      81.7 
 
     77 
     18.3 
 
  421 
   
Dedicated Executive 
Number 
Row % 
 
  433 
  100.0 
 
        0 
        0.0 
 
       0 
       0.0 
 
  433 
Non-Executive Networker 
Number 
Row % 
 
      0 
      0.0 
 
      81 
      75.0 
 
     27 
     25.0 
 
  108 
   
State Representative 
Number 
Row % 
 
    36 
    55.4 
 
      28 
      43.1 
 
       1 
       1.5 
 
  65 
   
Dedicated Non-Executive 
Number 
Row % 
 
   133 
   100.0 
 
        0 
        0.0 
 
       0 
       0.0 
 
  133 
All Directors 
Number 
Row % 
 
    602 
      51.9 
 
    453 
      39.1 
 
   105 
       9.1 
 
1160 
Note: Includes both Top 100 and Non Top 100 (medium or large) French and Non 
French companies. 
Source:  French business elites database.  This contains data on the 1,160 directors 
(executives and non-executives) of the Top 100 Companies in France in 1998. 
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Table 5:  Connectivity by Non-Executive Appointments of the French Business Elite* (n 
= 1,160) 
Appointment by 
Organization 
Type 
Power Base* 
CB 
(n = 898) 
ICB 
(n = 115) 
B&F 
(n = 60) 
L&P 
(n = 8) 
STATE 
(n = 65) 
ACAD 
(n = 14) 
Top 100 Co. 
Number** 
% in class  
 
    98 
    10.9 
 
       10 
         8.7 
 
    21 
    35.0 
 
       0 
       0.0  
 
    18 
    27.7 
 
      3 
    21.4 
Non Top 100 Co. 
Number** 
% in class 
  
  305 
    34.0 
 
     107 
       93.0 
 
    60 
  100.0 
 
        3 
     37.5 
 
     17 
    26.2 
 
      1 
      7.1 
Charity 
Number***  
% in class 
 
    64 
      7.1 
 
      35 
      30.4 
 
    10 
    16.7 
 
       1 
     12.5 
 
      5 
      7.7 
 
      2 
    14.3 
Public Body 
Number*** 
% in class 
 
  204 
    22.7 
 
      61 
      53.0 
 
    40 
    66.7 
 
       6 
     75.0 
 
     65 
   100.0 
 
    11 
    78.6 
Business Assoc. 
Number*** 
% in class  
 
  253 
    28.2 
 
      77 
      67.0 
 
    48 
    80.0 
 
       5 
     62.5 
 
     19 
     29.2 
 
      6 
    42.9 
Education 
Number*** 
% in class 
 
    96 
    10.7 
 
      44 
      38.3 
 
    19 
    31.7 
 
       2 
     25.0 
 
     24 
     36.9 
 
    11 
    78.6 
Culture/Sport 
      Number*** 
      % in class 
 
    64 
      7.1 
 
      35 
      30.4 
 
    10 
    16.7 
 
       1 
     12.5 
 
      5 
      7.7 
 
      2 
    14.3 
Notes: * Power base is defined by current primary association. CB = French 
corporate board; ICB = international (non-French) corporate board; B&F = 
investment bank or the investment banking arm of a large bank; L&P = law or other 
profession; STATE = politics or public administration; ACAD = academic world. 
**Total number of appointments held. ***Number of individuals holding such an 
appointment. 
Source:  French business elites database.  This contains data on the 1,160 directors 
(executives and non-executives) of the Top 100 Companies in France in 1998.   
 
  
 
 
